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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ALFRED ROGER MOORE, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This suit was brought under the provisions of the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act. By his complaint, Plaintiff, 
Alfred Roger Moore, sought damages for a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc, straining and spraining of the spine, and 
other alleged elements of damage. The case has been tried 
two times. At the close of the first trial the jury returned 
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a verdict for plaintiff in. the sum of $12,500.00 The trial 
judge set aside this verdict and granted a new trial. On 
th~ second trial the jury returned a verdict for $35,000.00 
less $17,500.00 dimunition for contributory negligence, mak-
ing a net award of $17,500.00. The trial court thereupon 
entered judgment on the verdict and subsequently denied 
defendant's motion for a new trial. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 9, 1951, Moore and a fellow employee, Lyle 
Nichol, were working for the defendant Railroad clearing a 
cut, through which defendant's tracks pass, approximately 
three miles east of Range, Colorado. Moore's responsibility 
was to see that Nichol, who was operating a small shovel 
device known as a "huff loader," was informed of trains 
approaching the cut. About 11:00 o'clock a.m. Mr. Zellard 
Summe·rfield, another employee of defendant, came to the 
location where Moore and Nichol were working and in-
structed them to load the machine which Nichol was 
operating, and a large huff loader tire and wheel, onto a 
flatcar. The accident of which Moore complains occurred 
during the loading of the tire and wheel. 
The testimony of Moore and of Nichol as to the manner 
in which they attempted to load the tire and wheel onto 
the flatcar is in large part conflicting. Both agree, how-
ever, that the· huff loading device was used to lift the tire 
from the ·ground to the elevation. of the flatcar. The two 
men planned to 'accomplish the lifting of the tire by plac-
ing it in the bucket or scoop of the loader and operating 
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the lifting mechanism until the tire was raised to the de-
sired level at which time it could be dumped onto the flatcar. 
(A huff loader is a four wheel vehicle with heavy tractor 
type rear wheels and a shovel or bucket mechanism attached 
to the front which can be raised vertically for several feet 
above the level of the ground.) (See Ex.'s P-1 thru P-7.) 
Since the tire was too large to fit completely into the 
bucket, it was decided that Moore would hold the tire to 
prevent its falling out of the scoop while ·Nichol operated 
the lifting device. Moore testified that in order to hold the 
tire into the scoop he placed one hand on either side of the 
tire at about his shoulder level (R. 28), and that when the 
bucket had been raised to his knee level ( R. 30) the tire 
tipped toward him causing him to lose his balance (R. 31) 
and causing the tire to roll off ( R. 32) of his arms to the 
ground. The weight of the tire as it "rolled off" of Moore's 
arms "hurt my back," said Moore (R. 31). Tipping of the 
tire according to Moore's testimony (R. 31) was caused by 
the moving of the huff loader while the lifting device was 
in operation. Nichol denied that the loader moved back-
ward while the tire was being lifted, stating that it could 
not have moved under the circumstances (R. 185). 
After this incident according to Moore's own testimony, 
he "picked up the tire and brought it around, and put it in 
the bucket again in the same manner" (R. 32). On the 
second attempt the tire was lifted successfully. The "in-
jured" man then assisted (R. 105) in the loading of 400 
pound timbers onto the railroad car (R. 208). Defendant's 
witnesses testified that Moore: did not complain to them 
on the day of the alleged injury (R. 180, 209), and Nichol's 
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testimony was that at the time of the incident there was 
no indication by Moore's manner or movement that he had 
been injured (R. 180). Plaintiff's testimony, however, 
was to the contrary (R. 32, 34). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
16 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT 
WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH THEY COULD FIND THAT PLAIN-
TIFF HAD SUSTAINED A RUPTURED IN-
TERVERTEBRAL DISC AS A PROXIMATE 
RESULT OF THE INCIDENT WHICH OC-
CURRED ON THE 9TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1951. 
(a) There was not sufficient evidence of the ex-
istence of a disc injury to go to the jury. 
(b) The evidence is not sufficient to show a causal 
connection between the accident and the al-
leged disc injury. 
(c) The trial court's refusal to withdra~v the issue 
of a disc injury from the jurors' consideration 
was prejudicial. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 12 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE INSTRUCTED 
THE TRIER OF FACT THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
ONLY RECOURSE FOR COMPENSATION 
FOR HIS INJURIES WAS AGAINST THE DE-
FENDANT RAILROAD. 
POINT III. 
THE ·TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 13 INVOLVING AN ISSUE 
NOT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS OR 
THE EVIDENCE AND NOT BEFORE THE 
COURT OR THE JURY. 
POINT IV. 
A GROSS AWARD OF $35,000.00 FOR PLAIN-
TIFF'S ALLEGED INJURIES IS SO EXCES-
SIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE AS TO COMPEL THE CONCLU-
SION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED 
BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESS-
ING DAMAGES AND THE TRIAL. COURT 
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERR 0 R IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S ' MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE 
DAMAGES. 
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THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT.'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
16 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT 
WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH THEY COULD FIND THAT PLAIN-
TIFF HAD SUSTAINED A RUPTURED IN-
TERVERTEBRAL DISC AS A PROXIMATE 
RESULT. OF THE INCIDENT WHICH OC-
CURRED ON THE 9TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1951. 
The most serious injury of which plaintiff complains 
is a "ruptured intervertebral disc in the lower lumbar 
region of his. spine" (R. 3-4). While there was testimony 
sufficient, if be1ieved, to show a back strain or sprain (as 
alleged), the only evidence tending to prove that plaintiff 
suffered a disc injury was the testimony of plaintiff's 
single expert witness, Dr. Clegg. Dr. Clegg's testimony in-
dicated that there was a "possibility" that plaintiff was 
suffering from a ruptured intervertebral disc. Objections 
to the admission of tris testimony were overruled. At the 
close of the evidence defendant requested the trial court 
to instruct the jury that there was no evidence upon which 
they could base a finding that the· plaintiff suffered a rup-
tured disc as a result of the accident. The trial court refused 
the requested instruction and exceptions were duly taken 
( R. 254, 256 and 263) . 
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This appeal does not challenge the admissibility of the 
doctor's speculative testimony; the only issue in connection 
therewith is whether the doctor's testimony, standing alone, 
is sufficient evidence to justify the trial court in allowing 
the jury to consider whether plaintiff had sustained the 
alleged disc injury. 
As plaintiff, it was incumbent upon Moore to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence every essential element 
of his cause of action including the items of damage alleged. 
That no recovery may be had for damages unless they are 
shown with reasonable certainty, and are proved to be 
the direct, natural and proximate circumstances of the de-
fendant's wrongful act, is elementary. 15 Am. Jur. 410, 
25 c. J. s. 493. 
A common statement of the rule is set forth in S. H. 
Kress and Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693, 126 So. 650, 68 
A. L. R. 167, where it is said: 
"It is a statement of the rule generally found 
in the books that the damages recovered in any case 
must be shown with reasonable certainty both as 
to their nature and in respect to the cause from 
which they proceed. In a case like this [personal 
injury], that general statement is qualified by the 
additional statement that the consequential damage 
and the extent thereof must be established as a 
reasonably certain probability." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar plaintiff alleged as one ele·ment of 
damage, a ruptured intervertebral disc injury. It was his 
burden therefore to prove ( 1) that he was suffering from 
such an injury; and (2) that it was caused as a direct and 
proximate result of the defendant's negligence. 
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(a) There was not sufficient evidence of the ex-
istence of a disc injury to go to the jury. 
The very nature of the alleged injury, being internal, 
with only subjective symptoms, requires the testimony of 
an expert to establish its existence. As was said by the 
Mississippi Court inS. H. Kress & Co. v. Sharp, supra: 
"The case is not one of external injuries, where 
the court and jury could see them and know the 
extent thereof. It is solely of internal injuries, and 
presents a case where the information given the 
jury should be full, as well as dependable and cogent, 
out of all fairness to the Court as well as to the 
defendant, who is usually largely helpless and de-
pendent in such cases." 
So it is in the present case. Moore's testimony, while 
adequate, if believed to show the alleged back strain, does 
not tend to prove that he suffered from a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc. Whether or not he sustained such an injury 
is certainly not within the grasp of the common mind, and 
under the particular circumstances of this case, even the 
expert with the aid of the history related by Moore, was 
unable to detern1ine whether there was a probability of such 
an InJury. 
It is well established that where an injury is of such 
character as to require skilled men to ascertain the nature, 
extent and/ or cause thereof, the question is one of science 
and the injury must be proved by the testimony of ex-
perts. See, e.g. Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668, 240 P. 
2d 91; Vaden v. Holmes, 39 Cal. App. 2d 580, 103 P. 2d 1002. 
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The only expert testimony offered to prove the alleged 
disc injury was given by Dr. Reed Clegg. The sufficiency of 
evidence tending to prove the existence of such injury must 
therefore stand upon his testimony. The doctor's testimony 
follows ( R. 63-65) : 
"Q. Doctor, assuming this man was injured on 
August 9, 1951, and he was in the process of loading 
a big heavy tire, weighing anywhere from 3 to 5 
hundred pounds, onto a sort of a shovel, that came 
down and caught much of the weight in his arms, 
causing him to lean over to the side, and he felt a 
sharp pain in his back, assuming that he had not 
had any trouble with his back before that time, 
assuming these things, and what you found on your 
examination, would you have an opinion as to 
whether this condition you found in his back, was 
caused by the accident which I referred to? 
"A. I d o. 
"Q. What is your opinion? 
"A. All I could say is that it is possible that 
the accident could either initiate it or . . . 
"MR. ASHTON: Just a minute, doctor. We 
object, your Honor, it is conjectural and a possibil-
ity, not any probative value. 
"THE COURT: That objection will be sus-
tained to the statement as made. 
"Q. (Mr. Roberts) Do you have an opinion 
-a medical opinion, in connection with this matter. 
"A. I do. 
"Q. Without using the word 'possible'-we, do 
not have a choice of words, legally speaking-do 
you have an opinion, doctor, without putting it in, 
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as assuming these things which I have related to 
be true? 
''MR. ASHTON: He has said 'possible' your 
Honor. Mr. Roberts is asking him to change his 
testimony. 
"MR. ROBERTS: The record will show what 
I am doing. 
"MR. ASHTON: It does, your Honor, and the 
doctor has said 'a possibility.' If the doctor wants 
to change his testimony-he has now indicated a 
possibility. 
"THE COURT: Proceed. 
"A. In medicine, we cannot come out defin-
itely on things, very often and say absolutely defin-
itely that such-and-such a condition is so-and-so, but 
we usually qualify our diagnosis, because sometimes 
we get fooled, and we· use the word 'possible' and 
that is all I can probably state. I cannot say defin-
itely that this is probab.ly or definitely that it is. It 
is just a possible condition; that was my opini()'fl,. 
(Emphasis added.) 
"Q. (Mr. Roberts) Is that your opinion? 
"A. Yes . 
• 
"Q. Now do you have an opinion as to what 
is causing this nerve irritation as you describe it? 
"A. I do. 
"Q. V\Till you give us your opinion on that? 
"A. Again it is a possibility. It is my opinion 
that this is poss"ibly due to pressure on the nerve in 
the lower spine, due to irritation from a disc." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The doctor repeatedly affirmed throughout his testimony 
that a disc injury was only a "possibility" (See R. 66, 73, 
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82). The quoted testimony clearly indicates that the doctor 
was not prepared to testify that there was even a medical 
"probability" of such an injury. 
There is a marked contrast between the quoted testi-
mony and other testimony given by Dr. Clegg. Earlier in 
the trial he had testified (R. 61) : 
"A. I felt, with the other findings such as 
limitation of straight leg raising, and limitation of 
forward flexion, in an attempt to touch the floor 
without bending, the knees, and with the very slight 
variation, slight X-ray changes that were present, 
and following the subsequent examination on the 
2nd day of March, 1954, it was my opinion that Mr. 
Moore had irritation of the nerves of the lower spine 
.... " (Emphasis added.) 
This detailed listing of the symptoms and the conclu-
sion that "it was my opinion" is probably definite enough 
to support a finding by the jury that there was some nerve 
irritation even though the doctor necessarily relied for his 
conclusion entirely upon his analysis of the symptoms. 
The testimony offered to prove a disc injury was also 
necessarily based upon the ascertainable symptoms, the his-
tory, and the "entire picture" (R. 80), but, notwithstanding 
this, the doctor was able to conclude with respect to the 
disc injury only that "It is just a possible condition" (R. 
64). This testimony, we submit, is not sufficient to support 
a finding of a disc injury. 
Diagnosis of a disc injury need not be speculative if 
there is sufficient evidence for the medical expert to work 
with. See, for example, the detailed listing of symptoms 
and tests observed and made by the medical expert in the 
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case of Mickel v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 991, 156 S. W. 2d 
721, 728. In that case the doctor was able to make a posi-
tive and direct diagnosis of a disc injury, leaving no room 
for speculation. The doctor's testimony in the present case 
falls within the category of speculation, conjecture and 
surmise. 
It is recognized, as testified, that "very often" doc-
tors "cannot come out definitely on things" and some-
times they cannot even state that there "probably" is such 
an injury. The inadequacy of science, however, in such 
cases. is no justification for submitting the question to a 
lay· jury. When medical testimony fails to establish more 
than a "possibility" of injury and there is no other corrob-
orating evidence the plaintiff has failed to prove to a 
reasonably certain probability, his damage. We have found 
no cases which dissent from this proposition. 
A case in point is Halnan v. New England Tel. & Tel. 
296 Mass. 219, 5 N. E. 2d 209. In that case plaintiff 
sought recovery for injuries sustained by him while he 
was in the employ of defendant. One of defendant's wit-
nesses testified that an expert called by plaintiff. had "ex-
pressed the opinion that it was possible that there was a 
pin point fracture in the skull through which inter-cranial 
fluid might be· escaping and that as a result of the blow 
on the head there might be inter-cranial pressure." At the 
close of the evidence defendant requested a ruling that there 
was "no evidence from which the court would be justified 
in finding that tpe plaintiff as a result of the accident ... 
suffered any increase in inte·r-cranial pressure or leakage 
of inter-cranial fluid." The trial court refused to so rule 
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and an appellate court affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts it was held that the refusal to grant 
the requested ruling was prejudicial error. The court said: 
"The testimony of an expert witness merely 
that a described condition is 'possible' or 'might' 
exist as a consequence of a stated cause does not 
support a conclusion that suck a condition exists as 
a result of that cause. De Filippo's Case, 284 Mass. 
531, 534, 188 N. E. 245, and cases cited. Even if the 
plaintiff's expert had given such testimony from 
the witness stand it would not warrant a conclusion 
that as a result of the accident the plaintiff suffered 
any increase in 'inter-cranial' pressure or leakage of 
'inter-cranial' fluid . . . There was no evidence jus-
tifying the trial judge in finding that the condition 
existed." (Emphasis added.) 
In Lyons v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 258 Ill. 75, 101 N. E. 
211, plaintiff's medical witness testified "I formed the 
opinion that he might have a fracture of the anterior fossa, 
which is above the eye-a fracture of the bone-for the 
reason that the injury to the eye (the bloodshot eye appear-
ance) appeared late. It did not appear immediately, as it 
does after a direct blow. It appeared between the third 
and fourth day ... I could not have an absolute opinion on 
that without an X-ray plate showing that fracture of the· 
orbital plate." The trial court allowed the jury to consider 
the evidence and on appeal this was held to be prejudicial 
error. The court, discussing the development of the opinion 
rule, said: 
"While it is often difficult to draw a line be-
tween legitimate inference and bare conjecture, only 
such inferences may be drawn as are rational and 
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natural. (Citing authorities.) Mere surmise or con-
jecture is never regarded as proof of a fact, and 
the jury will not be allowed to base a verdict thereon. 
If a witness has not sufficient and adequate means 
of knowledge, his evidence should not be considered. 
(Citing authority.) 
"If this physician had testified that, from his ex-
perience in such matters, his judgment was that 
there was a fracture of the frontal bone, such evi-
dence, under the authorities, might have been ad-
missible." 
The Utah court is committed to the same doctrine; i. e. 
that a mere "possibility" is not sufficient where the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving his case by a preponderance 
of the evidence. In Chief Consolidated Mining Co. v. Salis-
bury, 61 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929, this court, upsetting an 
award of the Industrial Commission said: 
"There is no positive or direct statement on the 
part of the physicians testifying that in their judg-
ment the accident did accelerate the disease which 
caused death . . . nor any fact proven from which 
it might legally or reasonably be deduced that the 
accident did accelerate the disease." 
The court in the Salisbury case was talking about the degree 
of proof required to prove the casual connection between a 
known disease, disability or death and the accident. The 
burden of proof is the same, however: plaintiff must show 
to a reasonably certain probability that he was suffering 
from the alleged injury, and also that the alleged injury was 
the proximate cause of the accident. 
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The rule laid down in the Salisbury case, i. e. that the 
medical testimony must be "positive and direct" or it must 
be corroborated by other evidence is recognized in the later 
cases. In Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., 
102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070, this court, referring to the 
Salisbury case and distinguishing it on the fa-cts said : 
"In that case there was no opinion of the physi-
cians that the accident did accelerate the chronic 
heart disease. They only went so far as to say it 
might have done so. Therefore the event of the acci-
dent could be connected with the event of the death 
according to the view this court then took of the 
matter, only by conjecture, and not by evidence·. 
This court in that case went on to say 'nor is there 
any fact proven from which it might legally or rea-
sonably be deduced that the accident did accelerate 
the disease.' In this case there are such facts. The 
specific member was injured and from that time 
on grew progressively worse until death." 
The Utah Fuel case affirms the proposition that "might 
have" is not enough. 
In a still more recent case, Thomas & Dee Memorial 
Hospital Association et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., 
104 Utah 61, 138 P. 2d 233, this. court, though holding that 
the evidence was sufficient to support an award, again de-
clared: 
" .. merely showing a possibility ... will not suf-
fice." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 
Utah 25, 163 P. 2d 331, the Utah Supreme Court quoted with 
approval the above language, but vacated the decision of the 
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Industrial Commission denying compensation because they 
found that there was ". . . more than a mere possibility" 
(Emphasis added). 
The above cited Utah cases were reviews from decisions 
of the Industrial Commission. Yet, notwithstanding, the 
policy in such cases, that "doubts respecting the right to 
compensation should be resolved in favor of the employee 
or his dependents" and that the "Industrial Act must be 
liberally construed." in an "attempt to effectuate its bene-
ficient and humane objects" (Salt Lake City v. Industrial 
Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P. 2d 644), the rule is, 
even, in those cases, that a "possibility" is not sufficient. 
There~ is. one important distinguishing element between 
the above cited Utah cases and the case at bar. In those 
cases the question was whether the cause of the injury had 
been sufficiently established. In the present case there is 
the additional question, was there such an injury? The 
distinction is important because when the existence of the 
injury has been clearly established, then lay testimony may 
corroborate medical testimony that the cause of. the injury 
was the accident complained of. That is, courts have con-
sidered that when the injury is known (i. e. broken limbs, 
disease, death) the fact that the condition of the person 
grew progressively worse after the accident is some corrob-
oration even for speculative medical testimony as to cause. 
This is aptly pointed out by Justice Wolfe in Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, supra, where it is said: 
"When the event of accident is definite and in-
jures a particular member or part of the body and 
afterward disability or death occurs and the progres-
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sion toward disability or death can definitely be as-
certained as beginning with the former event be-
cause the history of the progression directly in-
volves a worsening of the member or part to which 
the injury occurred or the evidence involves a con-
nection between the trauma and other affected 
parts in the history of the progressive worsening, 
there will be sustaining evidence for an award." 
In the Utah Fuel case it was clearly established that 
the injured person was suffering from "carcinoma of the 
testicle." 
In the case at bar the fact that plaintiff's testimony 
indicated trouble with his back and that such trouble began 
after and not before the accident, is some evidence that the 
accident may have caused a back injury. It is no evidence, 
however, that the particular injury caused was a ruptured 
disc. The jury was justified in concluding from such testi-
mony that plaintiff had sprained or strained his back, as al-
leged, but it certainly was not within their grasp to determine 
that he sustained a ruptured disc, when the medical expert, 
taking into consideration the entire history of the injury, 
was only able to state that this was "just a possible con-
dition". In the case at bar there was no corroborating testi-
mony as to the existence of a disc injury, nor could there 
have been unless plaintiff had introduced other expert 
witnesses. The case therefore falls within the rule that "a 
possibility" is not sufficient evidence where the fact to be 
proved must be established as a "reasonably certain prob-
ability." 
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(b) The evidence is not sufficient to show a causal 
connection between the accident and the al-
leged disc injury. 
As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, "a possi-
bility" is not sufficient, under Utah law, to sustain a find-
ing that the cause of an injury was the accident complained 
of. It appears that this rule is universally accepted. A col-
lection of the cases can be found in 135 A. L. R. 516 under 
an annotation labeled "Sufficiency of expert evidence· to 
establish causal relation between accident and physical 
condition or death." The annotator there concludes: 
"It appears to be well settled that medical testi-
mony as to the possibility of a causal relation be-
tween a given accident or injury and the subsequent 
death or impaired physical or mental condition of the 
person injured is not sufficient, standing alone, to 
establish such relation. By testimony as to possi-
bility is meant testimony in which the witness as-
serts that the accident or injury 'might have', 'may 
have', or 'could have' caused, or 'possibly did' cause 
the subsequent physical condition or death or that a 
given physical condition (or death) 'might have', 
'may have', or 'could have' resulted or 'possibly did' 
result from a previous accident or injury-testi-
mony, that is, which is confined to words indicating 
the possibility or chance of the existence of the cau-
sal relation in question and does not include words 
indicating the probability or likelihood of its exis-
tence .... " 
A very good analysis of the problem is set out in 
Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668, 240 P. 2d 91. In that 
case plaintiff sought recovery for injuries which allegedly 
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were caused by an automobile accident. The court, ruling 
that there was not sufficien.t evidence of the causal connec-
tion, said: 
"We think that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff, 
under the facts of this case, to prove not only that 
the accident could have caused the injury, but that 
. it probably did. This question has been considered 
by numerous courts and the authorities have been 
collected in the exhaustive note to the case of Burton 
v. Holden and Martin Lumber Co., 112 Vt. 17, 20 A. 
2d 99, 135 A. L. R. 512, where may be found most 
of the cases in the United States up to that time 
on the question; and the authorities clearly hold that 
medical testimony as to the possibility of a causal 
relation between a given accident or injury and the 
subsequent impaired physical condition of the per-
son injured is not sufficient, standing alone, to es-
tablish such a relation ... 
"To us the evidence in this case does not mea-
sure up to that required in Oklahoma Natural Gas 
Co. v. Kelly, supra. We quote from that opinion 
[194 Okla. 646, 153 P. 2d 1012] : 'While there is 
authority to the contrary, we are committed to the 
rule that opinion evidence, such as that given by the 
plaintiff's witnesses ... that a certain cause "might", 
"could" or "possibly" did or would bring about a cer-
tain result is competent and may have some pro-
bative value. Glen L. Wigton Motor Co. v. Phillips, 
163 Okla. 160, 21 P. 2d 751, and authorities there 
cited. See also 20 Am. Jur. 733; L. R. A. 1915 A., 
at page 1070; 22 C. J. 721, notes 60 and 61; 32 C. 
J. S. Evidence, § 556, p [age] 366, notes 20 and 21. 
The value of such evidence is ordinarily for the trier 
of the facts. But where such evidence is not cor-
roborated or supplemented by other evidence, and 
where the fact necessary to be established must be 
proved by testimony of a qualified expert, such evi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
dence, standing alone is generally held to be insuf-
ficient to make out a prima facie case. 135 A. L. R. 
516-529, annotation.' The corroborating evidence 
is lacking here. 
"We also adhere to the rule that where an in-
jury is of such character as to require skilled and 
professional men to determine the cause thereof, the 
question is one of science and must be proved by 
their testimony.'' 
Quoting from the Missouri case of Hunt v. Armour & 
Co., 345 Mo. 677, 136 S. W. 2d, 312, 316, the court went 
on to say: 
" 'It is now well settled that, in matters where 
the evidence does not exclude all other causes and 
in which no laymen could know or have any reason-
able basis for an inference as to cause, opinions of 
doctors that a certain occurrence or condition might, 
could, or would produce a certain result is no more 
than an assurance that such a result was scientifi-
cally possible, and does not alone constitute substan-
tial evidence that such occurrence or condition did 
cause it.' " 
With this well defined rule in mind, we pass to a review 
of the evidence in the case at bar. 
As before, the only expert testimony bearing upon 
causation was that given by Dr. Clegg. We refer the reader 
to those portions of the transcript quoted under (a) supra 
and particularly the following (R. 63) : 
"Q. . . . would you have an opinion as to 
whether this condition you found in his back was 
caused by the accident which I referred to? 
"A. I d 0. 
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"Q. What is your opinion. 
"A. All I could say is that it is possible that 
the accident eould either initiate it, or . . . ( objec-
tion)" 
A reading of this portion of the doctor's testimony in con-
text reveals that the "condition" referred to was nerve irri-
tation. Testimony following this indicates that the doctor 
thought there was a possibility that the nerve irritation 
was caused by a ruptured disc (R. 64, 65). There is no 
direct medical testimony, however, that the injured disc 
itself (if any) was caused by the incident of August 9th, 
1951. 
Assuming that there was a disc injury it is highly 
speculative that it was caused by the accident. This was 
pointed out by the doctor's testimony on cross examination 
and particularly the following portions (R. 68-77) : 
"Q. For instance, doctor, if these X-rays that 
you have shown us, looking at those X-rays alone, 
without any history, or without anything else, you 
would not diagnose a disc, would you? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. You would not diagnose even anything ab-
normal, would you? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. In other words, I think, as you said, the 
X-rays themselves are quite normal? . 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. So, so far as the X-rays are concerned, 
objectively, they alone, do not indicate anything that 
would justify you in diagnosing a disc? 
"A. That is correct. 
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"Q. Nor your neurological findings, as I un-
derstand you made some tests of his nerves going 
up and down, testing the nerves up and down his 
extremities; is that what you do, doctor? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. I suppose you measure the thighs and 
calves to see if there is any deterioration? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. In other words, if there is any serious 
numbness of disability in the lower limbs, resulting 
in this nerve impingement, you usually can find the 
muscles aren't as large and of as good a tone as 
usual; . isn't that right? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you find these muscles and legs nor-
mal? 
"A. They are in good condition, within normal 
limits .... 
"Q. Now referring, doctor, to these discs, 
which you diagnose there was a possibility of a disc 
impingement here, discs very frequently and com-
monly occur with people, without injury do they not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. In other words, frequently, as we get 
older, particularly if we have certain stresses and 
strains in our life, these discs between our vertebra 
will deteriorate until they get to the point where 
they break? 
"A. That is often the case. 
"Q. .i\.nd very frequently they get to that point 
of deterioration if we reach over and pick up a coin, 
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"Q. That does not mean the disc ruptured at 
that point, does it doctor? 
"A. No sir. 
* * * * * 
"Q. So frequently people have such a condition 
and have no pain, and do not know they have rup-
tured a disc? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. That can occur through ordinary wear and 
tear, we all go through? 
"A. Yes, due generally to wear and tear. 
"Q. And frequently people will have this situa-
tion called to their attention when they roll over in 
bed at night? 
"A. That is one way, yes. 
* * * * * 
"Q. Now suppose with me, if you will, doctor, 
that a man had as a vocation, and also as a hobby, 
riding horses, and even bucking horses, and he broke 
horses, participated in rodeos and calf roping, and 
also on occasion, had ridden in the wild horse races, 
and liked to do that sort of thing, would that shock 
and stress and strain on a back in the saddle, have 
some effect on a disc which was deteriorating to a 
point it would be subject and suspect to rupture? 
[That Moore had engaged in these activities is clear-
ly shown by other portions of the record.] 
''A. It certainly could. 
"Q. In other words, it is just the sort of thing 
that could cause a disc to rupture if it were deterior-
ated, is it not? 
"A. It is the type of physical activity which 
would cause it, yes." 
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On re-direct Dr. Clegg testified (R. 82) : 
"Q. . . . What percentage of the difficulties, 
as you have observed them, have been caused from 
injury, and what percentage by disease; do I make 
myself clear? 
"A. About 40% of the disc injuries resulted 
from injury, and about 60% resulted from what we 
call known injury, rheumatics or all of the other 
conditions." 
The material portion of Moore's testimony was in sub-
stance that he had a good back before the incident of August 
9th, and has suffered since that time. His suffering would 
tend to show some injury was caused by the accident, but 
again, it does not tend to show that the accident caused a 
"disc injury" because there is just as strong an inference 
that the sole injury he suffered was the back strain or 
sprain which he alleged. 
In summary, we find no medical testimony (either posi-
tive or conjectural) to support the causal connection and 
the most that can be inferred is that there was a "possible" 
connection. The lay testimony under the facts of this case 
would not corroborate medical testimony even if there had 
been some, because the worsening of plaintiff's condition 
after the accident was just as likely attributable to Moore's 
sprained back as to a supposed disc injury. 
We submit that the facts of the case at bar bring this 
case squarely within the rule laid down by this court in 
Chief Consolidated Mining Co. v. Salisbury, supra, where 
it was said: 
"There is no positive or direct statement on the part 
of the physicians' testifying that in their judgment 
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the accident did accelerate the disease which caused 
death, ... nor any fact proven from which it might 
legally or reasonably be deduced that the accident 
did accelerate the disease." 
This being so, the Court should have granted defen-
dant's requested Instruction No. 16 instructing the jury 
that there was not sufficient evidence of a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc to support a finding that plaintiff was suf-
fering from such an injury. 
(c) The trial court's refusal to withdraw the issue 
of a disc injury from the jurors' consideration 
was prejudicial. 
Dr. Clegg, after testifying that it was "possible" that 
Moore had a ruptured intervertebral disc, gave a detailed 
and illustrated explanation of what was meant by the term 
"ruptured disc" (R. 65, 66). The nature of such an inquiry 
was firmly engrained in the minds of the jury, and most 
likely influenced the jury a great deal in their determina-
tion of the damages. That plaintiff might be suffering from 
such an injury was not brought to the jury in just a casual 
manner. 
In addition to the emphasis placed on the injury, it 
appears from the evidence that the doctor's conclusion as 
to a 5% disability was based upon the assumption that 
plaintiff suffered a ruptured disc. With respect to this the 
doctor said (R. 82. See also R. 67) : 
"A. I feel the findings, the history of the phy-
sical findings, and X-ray changes that are present 
following an injury, are sufficient to warrant the 
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diagnosis of a possible disc injury, causing the 5% 
per·manent partial disability." (Emphasis added.) 
Had the jury been instructed that a finding of a disc in-
jury was not warranted by the evidence the jury would 
perhaps have totally rejected plaintiff's claim of perma-
nent disability. 
·Since it is impossible for this court to ascertain how 
much damages were awarded to plaintiff by reason of the 
alleged disc injury, or how much would have been awarded, 
if any, had the jury not been permitted to speculate as to 
the actual injuries sustained we submit that the case must 
be reversed for a new trial. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 12 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE INSTRUCTED 
THE TRIER OF FACT THAT "PLAINTIFF'S 
ONLY RECOURSE FOR COMPENSATION 
FOR HIS INJURIES WAS AGAINST THE DE-
FENDANT RAILROAD. 
By Instruction No. 12, given at plaintiff's request, the 
Court charged the jury· (R. 304) : 
"That at the time of the occurrence involved 
in this case plaintiff, Alfred Roger Moore, and de-
fendant were mutually engaged in interstate com·· 
merce. 
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"Under such circumstances the Statutes of the 
States of Utah and Colorado covering Employer's 
Liability and Workmen's Compensation are not ap-
plicable to this case and plaintiff's right to recover, 
if any, he has, is based solely on the Statutes of the 
United States covering the liability of common car-
riers by railroad to their employees for injuries 
caused while in the course of their employment." 
Exceptions were duly taken upon the grounds that the 
instruction was immaterial to any issue before the jury 
and prejudicial to the defendant (R. 261). 
We are unable to see any justification for an instruc-
tion on a point of law or fact so obviously abstract and 
immaterial. Perhaps the trial judge viewed it as a caution-
ary measure, but whatever the reason for its use, it is clear 
that plaintiff's right to recover for his injuries (if any) , 
under state laws, has no bearing whatsoever upon the issues 
which the jury was required to decide ( i. e. negligence, 
contributory negligence and damages). 
The instruction was not only wholly foreign to issues 
of the case, but calculated to engender sympathy and preju-
dice in the minds of the jury. The only reasonable conclu-
sion which the jury could draw from the language used is 
that the trial judge desired to impress upon their minds 
that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his in-
juries under State law and that his sole recourse was against 
the Railroad under Federal law. This, of course, was just 
one way of informing the jurors that unless their verdict 
required the defendant to pay for plaintiff's injuries, 
plaintiff would have to pay for them himself. Such an ap-
peal to sympathy is very likely to accomplish its purpose 
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where the plaintiff, as in this case, is made to appear as a 
man in financial distress, (R. 40), and the defendant, as 
here, is a notably financially responsible corporation. 
State workmen's compensation laws, are a form of 
insurance; and therefore, Instruction No. 12 is tantamount 
to an instruction that plaintiff is not covered by nor en-
titled to insurance proceeds as a result of his accident. 
Whether the instruction was in fact calculated to have this 
effect is beside the point; the important thing is that it did 
have such an effect. 
Evidence that plaintiff does not have insurance cover-
age is inadmissible and when the jury is allowed to consider 
such testimony the error is prejudicial. 
A case closely in point is Lee v. Osmundson, 206 Minn. 
487, 289 N. W. 63. In that case the Minnesota Supreme 
Court said: 
"Over proper objection, counsel for plaintiff 
made extensive inquiry to show that plaintiff had 
only liability coverage. The obvious inference is 
that he did not have collision insurance to protect 
him from loss to his own property. This of course 
was clearly inadmissible. It was foreign to the issues 
of the case and immaterial to the proof of the cause 
of action. Introduction of such testimony can serve 
but one purpose. While we do not rely on this erron-
eous receipt of evidence as a basis for reversal be-
cause of subsequent developments in the procedure, 
still we could not and would not approve a verdict 
for plaintiff should he ultimately succeed if such 
testimony were again introduced." 
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In a more recent case, J eddeloh v. H ockenhull, 219 Minn. 
541, 18 N. W. 2d 582, the same court quoted the above lan-
guage with approval, saying: 
"We are loath to upset verdicts and grant new 
trials where fact issues are involved. Our duty is 
clear, however, where the record shows that the 
jury's attention was diverted from the main issues 
by the erroneous admission of testimony which 
would likely influence it in deciding the issues sub-
mitted by the Court. vVe gave due warning in Lee 
v. Osmundson, 206 Minn. 487, 493, 289 N. W. 63, 
65, supra, that we would not approve a j_ury verdict 
where such testimony is received over objection ... " 
The cases are uniform that evidence of insurance or 
non-insurance is inadmissible in personal injury cases (with 
some exceptions which are not applicable here). See Anno-
tations in 56 A. L. R. 1418, supplemented in 7 4 A. L. R. 
849, 95 A. L. R. 388, 105 A. L. R. 1319 and 4 A. L. R. 2d 
761 (citing cases from 47 jurisdictions, in support of the 
general rule). A number of very recent cases are cited in 
the New Supplement Service for A. L. R. 2d Annotations. 
That Utah is in accord with the general rule was 
clearly established by Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. 
2d 224, wherein Justice Folland stated: 
"The universal rule is that it is irrelevant to 
the issue of negligence whether the defendant is 
carrying liability insurance or not and subject to 
some qualification which need not be here mentioned 
such testimony is wholly inadmissible." 
An examination of the cases cited in the above annotations 
reveals that where the jury has been informed of insurance 
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or absence of insurance the error is prejudicial unless in-
troduced inadvertently or to rebut evidence of insurance 
already introduced, or unless the error is cured by instruc-
tions to disregard the testimony, and a number of cases 
hold that even a subsequent instruction cannot cure the 
error because of the extreme likelihood that the evidence 
has done irreparable damage (see e. g. King v. Starr et al., 
43 Wash. 2d 115, 260 P. 2d 351). 
In the case at bar there was no evidence at trial that 
plaintiff had insurance coverage (Workmen's Compensa-
tion) ; there was no justification whatsoever for the instruc-
tion and no action taken to cure the error. Here the jury 
was informed of plaintiff's lack of insurance coverage 
(Workmen's Compensation) by the trial judge. Coming 
from the court who presides over the proceedings as an 
impartial and unbiased participant, this information would 
likely be given more weight and consideration than it would 
have, had the declaration come from a witness or advocate. 
Under these circumstances it seems to us manifest that an 
appellate court cannot surmise that such error did not in-
fluence the verdict of the jury, and especially so where 
the facts of the case indicate that the verdict appears to be 
excessive. 
The Mandate of the U. S. Supreme Court in Minneap-
olis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. S. 520 is 
controlling here. In that case the highest court reversed 
a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court which ordered 
a remittitur in a case tried under the F. E. L. A. It was 
held that the State court should have ordered a new trial. 
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The opinion read : 
"In actions. under the federal statute no verdict 
can be permitted to stand which is found to be in 
any degree the result of appeals to passion and 
prejudice. Obviously such means may be quite as 
effective to beget a wholly wrong verdict as to pro-
duce an excessive one. A litigant gaining a verdict 
thereby will not be permitted the benefit of calcula-
tion, which can be little better than speculation, as 
to the extent of the wrong inflicted upon his oppon-
ent." 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 13 INVOLVING AN ISSUE 
NOT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS OR 
THE EVIDENCE AND NOT BEFORE THE 
COURT OR THE JURY. 
By Instruction No. 13, given at plaintiff's request the 
court charged the jury ( R. 305) : 
The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides as fol-
lows: 
"That in any action brought against any com-
mon carrier under or by virtue of any of the pro-
visions of this chapter to recover for injuries to, 
. . . any of its employees, such employee shall not 
be held to have assumed the risks of his employ-
ment in any case where such injury ... resulted 
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of 
the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier; 
" 
Defendant duly excepted to the giving of the above 
instruction on the ground that the question of whether or 
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not the plaintiff does or does not assume the risk is imma-
terial to the issues of the case and the instruction is preju-
dicial to defendant (R. 261, 262). 
45 U. S. C. A~· § 54, part of which is quoted in Instruc-
tion No. 13, provides that assumption of risk shall be no 
defense to an action .brought under the F. E.· L. A. if the 
plaintiff has been injured by the negligence of an employee 
of a defendant railroad. Under the facts of the instant 
case defendant could not and did not assert the doctrine 
of ·assumption of risk as a defense. There was absolutely 
nothing in the pleadings or the evidence that ·would in any 
way intimate that assumption of risk was in issue. 
We recognize that the giving of instructions on abstract 
principles of law or fact, while improper, is often not 
prejudicial, and that under the · facts of this case, the giv-
ing of Instruction No. 13 may not have prejudiced the. de-
fendant. Nevertheless, the instruction is one that is fre-
quently requested by plaintiff's counsel in similar cases and 
is accepted by some of the trial judges and rejected by 
others. Because of this diversity of opinion at the trial 
level, and because we think the instruction is improper and 
harmful to the defendant, the issue should be decided for 
this and future cases. 
This court was confronted with the same question in 
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d 649, Cert. 
dismissed 65 S. Ct. 126, 323 U. S. 673, 89 L. Ed. 547. An 
examination of the briefs in that case reveals that a vir-
tually identical instruction was given by the trial court 
and the same objection was raised by defendant. In that 
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appeal plaintiff argued that it was the duty of the trial 
judge to instruct the jury that assumption of risk was no 
defense (see P. 85 of plaintiff's brief, case No. 6566) . De-
fendant, on the other hand, urged that in no case was it 
proper to instruct the jury on abstract issues of law and 
cited a Utah case, Riding v. Roylance, 63 Utah 221, 224 
Pac. 285, to the effect that an instruction on assumption of 
risk, though a proper statement of the law, is prejudicial 
error when outside the issues of the case (see defendant's 
brief, P. 42, case No. 6566). In Riding v. Roylance, supra, 
the Utah court said : 
"Appellant refers to many cases in support of 
the proposition that an instruction is improper 
which relates to matters outside the issues, or as 
to which there is no substantial evidence. It is not 
necessary to cite the authorities as the proposition 
is elementary." 
In the Bruner decision this court decided that under 
the facts of the case presented the giving of the instruction 
on assumption of risk was not prejudicial error concluding 
that: 
"Since we have held that the defendants were 
negligent in other respects as a matter of law, they 
could not have been prejudiced by this instruction. 
''The same holds true as to Instruction # 11 on 
the 'assumption of risk' doctrine. No such issue was 
raised by the pleadings or the evidence and no good 
purpose could have been served by the giving of such 
instruction." (Emphasis added.) 
This statement of law is not forceful enough to con-
vince some of our trial judges that the instruction is im-
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proper and error, for notwithstanding the Bruner opinion 
quoted above, the trial judge in this case, and district judges 
in other cases continue to so instruct the jury. The instruc-
tion is actually a "straw man" injected into the case for 
the purpose of conveying to the minds of jurors that the 
law favors the injured worker over the defendant Railroad. 
We submit that it is error to divert the minds of the jury 
from the issues of the case by the giving of such an in-
struction, and that this court should so declare in language 
that will assist the trial judges in determining the ·pro-
priety of such an instruction in future cases. As to 
whether it was prejudicial error, that question will have 
to be decided upon the peculiar facts of this case. Unlike 
the Bruner decision cited above, there is no element of 
negligence as a matter of law, shown here. 
POINT IV. 
A GROSS A WARD OF $35,000.00 FOR PLAIN-
TIFF'S ALLEGED INJURIES IS SO EXCES-
SIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE AS TO COMPEL THE CONCLU-
SION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED 
BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESS-
ING DAMAGES AND THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERR 0 R IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE 
DAMAGES. 
Defendant's motion for a new trial (R. 321) challenged 
the. propriety of the jury's verdict and the· court's judgment 
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on the verdict ( R. 320) . The jury assessed plaintiff's dam-
ages at $35,000.00 but cut the award in half by reason of 
contributory negligence (R. 319A). Appeal was taken from 
the order denying said motion (R. 323, 324). 
Moore quit school after beginning the 11th grade and 
never went back (R. 9). His first job was feeding cattle 
for a man by the name of Manford in Greeley, Colorado. 
He held this job for one year (R. 10). At the age of 18 he 
enlisted in the Navy and served for seven and one~half years 
as a signalman. Upon coming out of the Service in 1945, 
he went to work for the American Express at Greeley, 
Colorado (R. 10). He worked for the express company as 
a laborer for one year (R. 10). In 1946 Moore was em-
ployed by the Blue Ribbon Bakery in Greeley, as a delivery 
man, and in 1947 he went to work for Benton Land and 
Livestock Co. feeding cattle and irrigating (R. 11). Thus 
during the first ten years of his working career he served 
five different employers and for seven and one-half of these 
years he was in the Navy. In 1950 he went to work for the 
defendant Railroad as a section laborer (R. 12). At this 
time he was leasing a few acres of land upon which he 
raised hay and grazed a few sheep (R. 12). His salary 
while employed by defendant was about $256.00 per month. 
At the time of the "accident" of August 9, 1951, Moore 
was 31 years old and at the time of the trial, June, 1954, 
he was 34 years old. He is married and has one stepchild. 
Moore's employment after the accident was as un-
steady as it had been before. In the month of January, 
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1952, Moore quit the Railroad (R. 117). He had done quite 
well on his sheep in 1951 (R. 57) and he continued to care 
for these sheep until they were sold in July of 1953 (R. 
40). On the 15th of July, 1952, he went to work stacking 
hay (R. 47). He had no income from. this job because the 
man for whom he worked was accepting his services as 
payment for a debt. After the haystacking job during the 
summer of 1952, Moore secured a job driving trucks for 
a Vern Davis in Greenriver (R. 47). His salary was about 
$400.00 per month. on this job, but he quit in March of 1953 
(R. 48). In May of 1953 the Cater Construction Co. em-
ployed him as a laborer (R. 48). On direct examination 
Moore testified that he was released from this job because 
"I could not be steady". (R. 48), and also that he was not 
"working. steady" because of his back (R. 130). It de-
veloped in cross examination that Moore had worked ten 
and one-half hours a day digging post holes and hauling 
and setting posts, five or six days per week while he was 
employed by C.ater Construction Co. (R. 130-137 Ex. 9). 
lVfoore explained that his idea of working steady was seven 
days per week (R. 137). In July of 1953 Moore left the 
Cater Construction Co., went to work for the Deardon 
Lumber Co. at Burns, Colorado, and worked at this job 
until March of 1954 when he was laid off because there 
was no more work for him to do (R. 51). His testimony 
was that the· work at the lumber company turning logs, was 
"heavy" work requiring the use of back and legs (R. 145). 
At the time of the trial Moore was employed driving an 
oil truck for the Decker Trucking Co. at Greenriver, Utah 
(R. 52). 
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Moore's earning record before the accident as nearly 




The income for 1949 and 1950 includes $1700.00 salary 
plus $100.00 per month for groceries etc. which Moore re-
ceived in addition to his salary (See R. 57). In 1951, the 
year of the alleged injury Moore made approximately 
$5,000.00 almost twice as much as the preceding years (R. 
57). This was due to profit from his sheep (R. 57). (About 
$3,000.00 from the Railroad and $2,000.00 from his sheep). 
As to the extent of pain and suffering andjor tempor-
ary disability suffered by Moore, if any, defendant was 
somewhat at the mercy of Moore because these are largely 
subjective factors. The undisputed evidence including plain-
tiff's own medical testimony, however, directly opposes 
the conclusion that Moore was seriously injured. 
On the evening of the alleged injury Moore asked his 
foreman, Foster, for a 30 day leave of absence to put up his 
hay (R. 209-210, compare with R. 112). Foster testified 
that Moore was given a temporary leave and that he came 
back to work 13 or 14 days later. During that time Foster 
saw Moore cutting hay (R. 211). His testimony was that 
Moore had said absolutely nothing about his back in con-
nection with the requested leave of absence (R. 211). In 
October, 1951, just two months after the incident of August 
9th, Moore obtained a leave to go on a pack trip elk hunt-
ing (R. 115). That same fall (1951) Moore testified that 
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he taught some high school boys what he knew about box-
ing. When asked (R. 124) : 
"Q. You recall boxing several rounds with 
each of them?" 
He replied: 
"A. I showed them a few pointers, yes." 
Miss Dorothy Virden, testified that she watched Moore 
boxing with the high school boys. She testified that he 
stripped to the waist and boxed for one to two hours (R. 
220-221). There was nothing which indicated to her that 
Moore at that time was suffering from a bad back (R. 221). 
During the fall of 1951, just a few weeks or months 
after Moore's alleged injury he was observed as a regular 
participant in community dances (R. 219-220). 
In the spring of 1952, just a few months after the 
alleged. back injury of August 1951, Moore entered a calf 
roping contest (R. 118). This involved a timed competi-
tion between riders, the object being to see which "cowboy" 
could rope a 250 pound calf from a running horse, jump 
from the horse, throw the calf and tie three of its legs in 
the shortest amount of time (R. 119). 
During the early months of 1952 Moore rode horses 
to take care of his sheep (R. 110). In the fall of 1952 he 
again went elk hunting (R. 46). 
In May of 1953, Moore went to work for the Cater 
Construction Co. and worked ten and one-half hours per 
day at least five days per week doing extremely heavy 
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manual labor (hauling and setting poles) and yet never 
complained about his back (Ex. 9, R. 317). Each job that 
he has secured since August 9th has required strenuous 
physical exertion. 
In the fall of 1953, while working for the Deardon 
Lumber Co. he was photographed rolling and chopping logs 
with no apparent difficulty (R. 152). These movies were 
introduced in evidence (R. 234, 235, 243) and shown to the 
jury and spectators. Moore testified that the pictures ac-
curately depicted his activity on the occasion (R. 152). One 
of the defendant's witnesses, Dr. Lawrence N. Ossman, a 
respected orthopedic specialist after viewing the pictures 
said (R. 248) : 
"A. From the pictures alone, I would say he 
[Moore] had a per~ectly normal functioning back." 
Plaintiff's own expert witness, Dr. Clegg, testified (R. 79) : 
"Q. Would you expect that a person who acted 
very freely, with no limitation of motion whatsoever, 
and lifted heavy logs that weighed 2 or 3 hundred 
pounds,-the end of them, and lifted them freely 
with a canthook, and jumped and ran across the 
tops of them,-would you expect that he was suffer-
ing any from any impairment of his back? 
"A. At that particular time I would expect he 
had a good back.'' 
The moving pictures (Exhibits "1", "2" and "3") in con-
nection with the testimony of the experts speak for them-
selves as to the extent of Moore's injuries, if any. 
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The only medical testimony tending to indicate the 
extent of injury aside from the doctor's statements in con-
nection with the moving pictures was that given by Dr. 
Clegg. He examined Moore in January of 1953, and again 
in March of 1954. The X-rays taken of Moore's back ac-
cording to the doctor's testimony were normal and might 
well have been taken .from the back of any ordinary pe·rson 
of Moore's age (R. 68, 69). There was "very slight" muscle 
spasm ("tenseness of a muscle") (R. 74). The doctor gave 
his opinion that at the time of the first examination Moore 
was "slightly handicapped" (R. 80), and that at the time 
of the second examination he was "very slightly handi-
capped" in motion (R. 80). It was the d6ctor's testimony 
that due to the "possibility" of a disc injury (R. 82 lines 
8-11) it was his opinion that Moore would suffer a 5% 
permanent partial disability (R. 66). Even conceding, for 
the purpose of argument, that the jury was justified in 
finding a disc injury and thus a partial permanent disabil-
ity the doctor's explanation of such a disability indicates 
that it is very small indeed. Material portions of his testi-
mony are (R. 73) : 
"Q. Further, a 5% disability is a very minimal 
percent of disability, isn't it? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. That does not disqualify men, according 
to your statement from manual labor? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. They can do manual labor? 
"A. They can do manual labor." 
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Moore's condition at the time of second examination was 
such that he could do "heavy work", the doctor said (R. 76). 
No medical expenses were alleged or proved. Though 
it was sh:)wn that Moore's income decreased after the in-
jury it is not established that the decrease was due to the 
I"'( 
injury. He made money on the sheep he had during the 
year of his injury (1951) and he apparently devoted con-
siderable time to his sheep thereafter. The fact that Moore's 
sheep were unprofitable after the accident was no fault of 
defendant. The unsteady nature of his employment is no 
proof, by itself, that the alleged injury was the cause, be-
cause his employment before the accident was very irregu-
lar and unsteady. Had the jury believed all of Moore's 
testimony, we feel that they could not have awarded in 
excess of $1,000.00 for loss of wages. 
In summary, the evidence shows a very minimal phy-
sical disability, if any; some pain and suffering; a small 
amount, if any, for loss of wages; and no medical expenses. 
We do not think that this evidence can justify a verdict 
which assesses plaintiff's damages as $35,000.00 (R. 319A). 
That amount is over twelve (12) times the average annual 
income of Moore for the two years preceding his alleged 
injury. At present insurance rates, $35,000.00 would pro-
vide Moore at age 34 with an· $1800.00 per year annual 
income for the rest of his life. (Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Company [Milwaukee, Wis.] rate book for 1955.) 
Invested at 6%, $35,000.00 would yield approximately 
$160.00 income per month. 
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Whether the damages in any instance are excessive, 
must, of course, be determined in accordance with the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Under the 
facts of the case at bar we think that it is manifest that 
the verdict of the jury was influenced by passion and 
prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
It is most respectfully submitted that error of the trial 
court in the proceedings below prevented defendant from 
receiving a fair trial on the issues and resulted in a grossly 
excessive award of damages, and that the judgment below 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
Counsel for Appellant. 
The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
